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Remarks on the Concept of Critique in Habermasian Thought 
 
Simon Susen 
 
 
 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of critique in Habermasian thought. 
Given that the concept of critique is a central theoretical category in the work of the Frankfurt 
School, it comes as a surprise that little in the way of a systematic account which sheds light 
on the multifaceted meanings of the concept of critique in Habermas’s oeuvre can be found  in 
the literature. This paper aims to fill this gap by exploring the various meanings that Habermas 
attributes to the concept of critique in 10 key thematic areas of his writings: (1) the public 
sphere, (2) knowledge, (3) language, (4) morality, (5) ethics, (6) evolution, (7) legitimation, 
(8) democracy, (9) religion, and (10) modernity. On the basis of a detailed analysis of 
Habermas’s multifaceted concerns with the nature and function of critique, the study seeks to 
demonstrate that the concept of critique can be considered not only as a constitutive element 
but also as a normative cornerstone of Habermasian thought.  The paper draws to a close by 
reflecting on some of the limitations of Habermas’s conception of critique, arguing that in 
order to be truly critical in the Habermasian sense we need to turn the subject of critique into 
an object of critique. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The concept of critique is a central theoretical category in Habermasian thought. Thus, it comes 
as a surprise that little in the way of a systematic account which sheds light on the multifaceted 
meanings of the concept of critique in Habermasian thought can be found in the literature.1 Given 
its pivotal importance and referential relevance in the work of both ‘the early’ and ‘the late’ 
Habermas, it would be no exaggeration to ascribe paradigmatic status to the concept of critique 
in Habermasian thought. As a concept with paradigmatic status, the notion of critique lies at the 
heart of Habermasian thought and, therefore, deserves to be examined in detail. This paper seeks 
to demonstrate that the concept of critique can be regarded not only as a constitutive element but  
also as a normative cornerstone of the social and political thought of Ju¨ rgen Habermas. 
If, following the predominant view in the literature (see, for example, Outhwaite 1996), we 
divide Habermas’s work into different thematic areas, we can identify at least 10 overarching and 
interconnected topics in his work: (1) Habermas’s theory of the public sphere,2 (2) Habermas’s 
theory of knowledge,3 (3) Habermas’s theory of language and communication,4 (4) Habermas’s 
theory of morality,5 (5) Habermas’s theory of ethics and law,6 (6) Habermas’s theory of 
evolution,7 (7) Habermas’s theory of legitimation,8 (8) Habermas’s theory of democracy,9 (9) 
Habermas’s theory of religion,10 and (10) Habermas’s theory of modernity.11 
Although these themes are closely interrelated and overlap on various levels in Habermas’s 
writings, it is useful to separate them from one another to illustrate the analytical complexity and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
wide-ranging scope of Habermasian thought. In light of the paradigmatic centrality of Haber- 
mas’s theory of communicative action, it would be fair to say that the foundational idea which 
underpins all of these themes is the view that in order to make sense of society we need to make 
sense of linguisticality: from a Habermasian perspective, what lies at the heart of any form of 
human society is the linguistically mediated, rationally guided, and communicatively coordinated 
realisation of social actions. In other words, to analyse social relations and social formations in 
communication-theoretic terms means to reconstruct their linguistic mediation, rational 
foundation, and communicative consolidation. According to Habermas’s communication-
theoretic view, then, social order is possible only as a communicative order, the purposive 
reproduction of humanity is unthinkable without the communicative coordination of society, and 
the substantive impact of social transformation always depends on the coordinative power of 
communicative interaction.12 
If, in accordance with Habermas, we give paradigmatic priority to communicative relations 
for understanding the very possibility of society, then our explanatory task consists in uncover- 
ing the linguistic foundations of the developmental contingency of society. The far-reaching 
implications of this view are reflected in the communication-theoretic presuppositions which 
undergird almost all of Habermas’s – i.e. both his ‘early’ and his ‘late’ – writings. Habermas’s 
communication-theoretic interpretation of the 10 thematic areas identified above can be sum- 
marised, somewhat aphoristically, as follows: 
(1) Public spheres cannot do without public communication (Habermas’s communication- 
theoretic account of the public sphere). 
(2) Knowledge claims are only conceivable as linguistically articulated validity claims 
(Habermas’s communication-theoretic account of knowledge). 
(3) Human language is essentially a product of human communication (Habermas’s 
communication-theoretic account of language). 
(4) Our moral development, as subjects capable of judgement and action, is intimately 
intertwined with our linguistic development, as subjects capable of speech and action 
(Habermas’s communication-theoretic account of mora lity). 
(5) Ethical and judicial conventions produced by different societies are historically specific 
arrangements based on communicatively established normativities (Habermas’s 
communication-theoretic account of ethics and law). 
(6) The historical evolution of society is shaped by the linguistic constitution of humanity 
(Habermas’s communication-theoretic account of evolution). 
(7) The stability of political legitimacy depends on its capacity to be considered worthy of 
rational acceptability (Habermas’s communication-theoretic account of legitimation). 
(8) The civilisational consolidation of political democracy is impossible without the 
communicational realisation of linguistic intelligibility (Habermas’s communication- 
theoretic account of democracy). 
(9) The metaphysical power of religious faith can and should be challenged by the 
postmetaphysical power of communicative reason (Habermas’s communication- 
theoretic account of religion). 
(10) The emancipatory potential of modern society is located in the critical potential of com- 
municative rationality (Habermas’s communication-theoretic account of modernity). 
The communication-theoretic presupposition that subjects who are ‘capable of speech and 
action’13 are also capable of reaching mutual understanding underlies most of Habermas’s writ- 
ings.14 The centrality of this assumption is indicative of the ambitious nature of the Habermasian 
project: in essence, the theory of communicative action represents a systematic attempt to 
 
  
 
 
explain the constitution and evolution of human society (Gesellschaftlichkeit) in terms of the 
nature and development of human linguisticality (Sprachlichkeit). 
Yet, if we acknowledge that Habermas’s communication-theoretic account of society stands 
in the tradition of critical theory, we must ask the following question: what is ‘critical’ about 
Habermas’s critical theory? Hence, not only do we need to pose the general question of what 
makes critical theory ‘critical’ (cf. Fraser 1991), but we also need to ask the specific question of 
what makes Habermas’s critical theory ‘critical’. A satisfying answer to this question may allow 
us to demonstrate that it is not only for biographical, but also – more importantly – for intellectual 
reasons that Habermas’s writings can, and should, be conceived of as standing within, rather than 
outside, the tradition of critical thought commonly associated with the work of the Frankfurt 
School.15 
The most obvious way to make a case for this view is to demonstrate that the central and 
unifying theme which underpins other versions of critical theory belonging to the tradition of the 
Frankfurt School is a fundamental and enduring concern in Habermas’s communication-theoretic 
variant of critical theory: the concept of critique. In other words, just as alternative versions of critical 
theory developed in the tradition of the Frankfurt School – such as Marcuse’s (2002 [1964]) need-
theoretic approach, Adorno’s (1997 [1970]) art-theoretic approach, Horkheimer’s (1976) reason-
theoretic approach, and, more recently, Honneth’s (1995 [1994]) recognition- theoretic approach –  
are essentially concerned with the problem of critique, Habermas’s version of critical theory – i.e. 
his communication-theoretic approach (Habermas 1987 [1981]-a, 1987 [1981]-b) – grapples with 
the idiosyncratic nature and social function of critique. 
Thus, if there is one feature that the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School have in common 
it is the fact that both their theoretical preoccupation with the nature of critique and their prac- 
tical engagement in the activity of critique lie at the heart of their respective normative projects. 
The following analysis seeks to contribute to a more fine-grained understanding of both the 
meaning and the role attributed to the concept of critique in Habermasian thought. Before exam- 
ining the analytical and normative significance of the concept of critique in Habermas’s writings, 
however, it seems sensible to reflect briefly upon the place of critique in contemporary social and 
political thought. 
Different social and political theories put forward different notions of critique. To be sure, the 
critical theory of the Frankfurt School does not possess, and does not claim to possess, a mono- 
poly on the concept of critique in the universe of social and political thought. The discursive and 
substantive force of critique cannot be said to have been confiscated by one particular 
paradigmatic approach or philosophical tradition. On the contrary, the multifaceted and eclectic 
ways in which the concept of critique can be interpreted and employed is symptomatic of its 
hermeneutic and pragmatic elasticity: critique can mean different things, and it can be used in 
different ways. 
Just as it can refer to the reflective – i.e. ‘critical’ – distancing from a given state of affairs, it 
can designate the actual immersion in a complicated – i.e. ‘critical’ – state of affairs. While cri- 
tique can be used to denounce a particular set of social relations, it can be brought into play to 
defend a particular set of social relations. Both the political left and the political right take part in 
the discursive exercise of critiquing the constitution of social relations. Both dominated and 
dominant social groups can convert critique into an ideological weapon to defend their respect- 
ive interests. And, contrary to the illusion that only intellectuals are capable of critically enga- 
ging with the world, both professional social scientists and ordinary social actors are equipped 
with the capacity to reflect upon themselves and the world by which they are surrounded. Cri- 
tique can be written or spoken, sung or painted, justified rationally or brought forward impul- 
sively, raised implicitly or evoked explicitly, positive or negative, constructive or destructive, 
integrative   or     disruptive,     consensus-oriented     or     conflict-ridden,     concessional   or 
 
  
 
 
uncompromising, moderate or radical, contingent or categorical, local or global, open or dog- 
matic, and – as some might argue – genuinely critical or essentially uncritical. In short, the 
concept of critique has a wide variety of context-specific meanings. 
This paper seeks to explore the various meanings that Habermas attributes to the concept of 
critique in his writings. As stated above, Habermas’s work can be broadly divided into 10 the- 
matic areas. The task of the following sections is to demonstrate that the concept of critique plays 
a pivotal role in each of these areas, illustrating its overall importance in Habermas’s social and 
political thought. 
 
1. Critique and the public sphere 
One of the most fundamental characteristics of critique is that it is public. Critique is never simply 
a private but always also a public affair because the reflective exercise of critiquing     the world 
is acquired through the social exercise of participating in the world. ‘With the linguistic turn 
epistemic authority passes over from the private experiences of a subject to the public practices 
of a linguistic community’ (Habermas 2000b, 324). Every criticising individual is a socialised 
individual, and the way in which individuals criticise the world is unavoidably affected by the 
way in which they have been socialised into the world. Since we cannot avoid acting in relation 
to society, we cannot avoid acting in relation to the public: just as every   social persona has a 
public persona, every form of social critique is a form of public critique. 
If – following Habermas (1989 [1962], 27) – ‘[t]he bourgeois public sphere may be con- 
ceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public’, then public critique 
can be regarded first and foremost as a critique of private people come together as public carriers 
of communicative reason. The existence of a healthy public sphere depends on the existence of 
healthy public reasoning: ‘the connection between rational-critical public debate and the legis- 
lative foundation of domination’ (Habermas 1989 [1962], 178) allows for the construction of a 
society whose legitimacy is exposed to the constant scrutiny of critical rationality. In short, the 
public sphere is a social arena for communicative critique based on intersubjective   reasoning. 
 
2. Critique and knowledge 
Another fundamental characteristic of critique is that it is inextricably linked to the production of 
knowledge. Indeed, the whole point of critical theory is to produce critical knowledge about the 
social world, that is, knowledge which refuses to take its own existence – or, to be more precise, 
the social constitution and the social function of its own existence – for granted. The ‘early’ 
Habermasian account of the intimate link between knowledge and human interests demonstrates 
that there is no comprehensive typology of critique without a social epistemology of interest. Just 
as our ‘technical cognitive interest’16 in producing ‘predictive knowledge’17 is epitomised in the 
rise of the ‘empirical-analytic sciences’,18 and just as our ‘practical cognitive interest [.. .] in the 
preservation and expansion of the intersubjectivity of possible action-orienting mutual 
understanding’19  is embodied in the development of the ‘historical-hermeneutic sciences’,20   our 
‘emancipatory cognitive interest’21 in human liberation from ‘dependence on hypostatized 
powers’22 is expressed in the emergence of the ‘critically oriented sciences’23. As purposive 
entities, we have an interest in acting upon the world; as communicative entities, we have an 
interest in acting with the world; and, as reflective entities, we have an interest in acting beyond 
the world. Purpose-oriented knowledge is concerned with explaining and controlling the 
functioning of the world; understanding-oriented knowledge is about establishing commu- 
nicative and consensual ties with the world; and critically oriented knowledge is aimed at 
uncovering and overcoming hidden power mechanisms in the world. As purposive beings, 
 
  
 
 
we are oriented towards instrumentality; as communicative beings, we are oriented towards 
intelligibility; and, as critical beings, we are oriented towards reflexivity. 
Our critical capacity permits us to transform our existential orientation towards instrumen- 
tality, intelligibility, and reflexivity into an object of scrutiny. In fact, it is particularly in 
situations of individual or collective crisis, caused by a clash with the unknown or a confronta- 
tion with the unexpected, that we are forced to question the validity of intuitive knowledge by 
virtue of discursive knowledge. Critique and knowledge are intimately intertwined because the 
development of knowledge is subject to the development of critique: the potential falsifiability of 
every knowledge claim is due to the intrinsic criticisability of every validity claim. As long as 
both ordinary and scientific claims to validity can be criticised, both common sense and expert 
knowledge can – at least in principle – be falsified. Thus, from a developmental perspective, the 
critique of knowledge is both in the interest of knowledge and in the interest of the species, for 
the evolution of the human condition depends on the evolution of human   cognition. 
 
3. Critique and language 
One of the most essential assumptions underlying Habermas’s theory of communicative action is 
that the normative foundations of critique are to be located in the rational foundations of 
language. Put differently, our ability to criticise stems from our ability to communicate; our 
critical capacity emanates from our communicative capacity; critique is embedded in language. 
If we recognise that human beings acquire the capacity to establish a critical relation to the world 
by virtue of their capacity to establish a linguistic relation to the world, then we are forced to 
acknowledge that their reflective competence cannot be divorced from their communicative 
competence. We develop our ability to contemplate and judge through our capacity to commu- 
nicate and reason. Paradoxically, to accept that our critical capacity and our communicative 
capacity are intimately intertwined means to comprehend that the act of critique is both a privi- 
leged and an ordinary affair: as a privileged affair, the act of critiquing something or somebody 
constitutes a distinctly human matter; as an ordinary affair, the act of critiquing something or 
somebody constitutes a quotidian matter. 
From Habermas’s communication-theoretic point of view, then, every ordinary subject 
capable of speech and action is capable of speech and reflection and, therefore, capable of speech 
and critique. Our expressive ability to speak about the world is closely interrelated    with our 
critical capacity to reflect upon the world. If critique is at home in the universe of language, then 
the normativity of every society is contingent upon the reflexivity of linguisticality. Indeed, the 
‘reflexivity of ordinary language’24 is symptomatic of the normativity of ordinary life: the 
reflexive potential inherent in human linguisticality can be mobilised to realise the normative 
potential built into ordinary sociality. It ‘is thereby presupposed that those acting 
communicatively are capable of mutual criticism. But as soon as we equip the actors with this 
capability, we lose our privileged position as observers in relation to the object domain’ 
(Habermas 1987 [1981]-e, 119, italics in original), for ordinary subjects capable of speech     and 
action are ordinary subjects capable of critique and action. In brief, critique’s house of being is 
the house of language. 
 
4. Critique and morality 
A key concern in Habermas’s reconstructive exploration of critical capacity is the study of the 
communicative nature of morality. In essence, critique and morality are inextricably linked 
because our moral ability to claim ethical validity is contingent upon our judgemental ability    to 
make sense of normativity. In other words, moral subjects can either accept or reject the 
 
  
 
 
normativity imposed upon them by their social environment, and – more importantly – they can 
give reasons for either complying with or deviating from the social norms to which they are 
exposed in their day-to-day interactions. The world of humanity is never simply a world of 
facticity but always also a world of validity: the world of social facts is a world of social 
norms. Our linguistic capacity enables us to question the givenness of the world by virtue of 
the outspokenness of the word, thereby submitting our daily immersion in morality to critical 
scrutiny. Our enclosure in society is inconceivable without our daily exposure to morality. Yet, 
the absorption of our subjectivity by the moral standards which are thrown at us by society can 
be challenged by mobilising the normative resources which are embedded in our critical capacity. 
Our interest in morality is due to ‘the interest of reason in human adulthood, in the autonomy 
of action, and in the liberation from dogmatism. This it achieves by means of the penetrating 
ideas of a persistent critique’ (Habermas 1988 [1963]-c, 256). If – following Kohlberg – we 
divide the moral development of human beings into a preconventional, a conventional, and a 
postconventional stage,25 and if – following Habermas – we assume that the moral formation of 
human beings is contingent upon their linguistic maturation (see Habermas 1990 [1983]-c, esp. 
160 – 70), then the development of our communicative capacity goes hand in hand with the 
development of our critical capacity. Critical capacity is an invaluable source of human autonomy 
in a world of moral diversity. Whereas preconventional morality obtains its validity from its 
unreflective obedience to authority and conventional morality gains its currency from its 
convenient immersion in conformity, postconventional morality derives its legitimacy from a 
discursively grounded sense of autonomy. 
To be sure, our critical capacity is both the motor and the outcome of human morality: as a 
motor of morality, our critical capacity can shape and transform the normative standards of 
society; and, as an outcome of morality, it is influenced by and embedded in the normative stan- 
dards of society. Regardless of the question of whether an analogy can be drawn between the 
moral evolution of individual entities and the moral evolution of collective entities, there is no 
doubt that both individual and collective learning processes are subject to the discursive interplay 
between our moral and our critical capacity. Put differently, the critique of morality cannot escape 
the morality of critique. 
 
 
5. Critique and ethics 
From a Habermasian perspective, ethics and law are essentially an evolutionary outcome of our 
moral condition. The moral universality of humanity manifests itself in the ethical contingency 
of society: the more differentiated the political and cultural arrangements of a particular society, 
the more complex the ethical and judicial standards of its polity. The gradual juridification26 of 
society is indicative of the increasing complexity of modernity: modern societies are ethically 
and judicially codified because modern lifeworlds are systemically functionalised. Habermas’s 
plea for a discourse ethics is based on the conviction that the purposive regulation of systemic 
functionality does not have to be – and should not be – disentangled from the communicative 
regulation of social normativity. In order to preserve the critical potential of modernity, the 
systemic colonisation of sociality, which is driven by the instrumental power of functionalist 
reason, needs to be challenged by the discursive re-autonomisation of sociality, which emanates 
from the intersubjective power of communicative reason. 
Discourse ethics [.. .] views the moral point of view as embodied in an intersubjective practice of 
argumentation which enjoins those involved to an idealizing enlargement of their interpretive per- 
spectives. Discourse ethics rests on the intuition that the application of the principle of universaliza- 
tion, properly understood, calls for a joint process of ‘ideal role taking’. [.. .] Under the pragmatic 
presuppositions  of  an  inclusive  and  noncoercive  rational  discourse  among  free  and  equal 
 
  
 
 
participants, everyone is required to take the perspective of everyone else, and thus project herself 
into the understandings of self and world of all others; from this interlocking of perspectives there 
emerges an ideally extended we-perspective [.. .]. (Habermas 1995, 117, italics added) 
A universal perspective on ethics is based on a universal ethics of perspective. A society of ideal 
members is a society of ideal role-takers, for only insofar as we can imagine ourselves as part of 
a common humanity can we project ourselves into a kingdom of ethical responsibility.     One of 
the functions of critique is to criticise function. The critique of function aims to functionalise 
critique. The critical stance of discourse ethics permits us to regulate the systemic orientation 
towards functional differentiality through our discursive orientation towards ethical universality. 
Putting oneself in the particular perspective of another member of society is the first step towards 
embracing the universal perspective of humanity. Critique allows us    to comprehend our ethical 
beyondness as part of our societal withinness. 
 
6. Critique and evolution 
The evolution of the human species cannot be separated from the mobilisation of social critique. 
Throughout history, humans have used the power of critical capacity to determine the develop- 
ment of society. In light of this insight, Habermas’s philosophy of critique can be conceived of as 
an anthropology of critique: first, insofar as critical capacity constitutes an anthropological 
invariant, it can be considered as a species-constitutive capacity; and, second, insofar as critical 
capacity constitutes an anthropological driving force, it can be regarded as a species-generative 
capacity. As a species-constitutive capacity, the ability to reflect upon both our external and our 
internal world represents a distinctly human faculty. As a species-generative capacity, the ability 
to determine both our personal and our collective life histories by virtue of critical reflection 
denotes a developmental faculty. 
Indeed, our ‘rational will that allows itself to be determined by good reasons’ (Habermas 
2000b, 328) puts us in the anthropologically privileged position of being able to claim author- 
ship27 for our personal and collective life histories. ‘Insofar as the historical subjects, as mature 
and  responsible  [mu¨ ndig]  individuals,  are  in  essence  the  subject of history’  (Habermas  1988 
[1963]-b, 246), their ‘reflective capacity of judgment constructs the progress of history’ (Haber- 
mas 1988 [1963]-b, 246). We have learned to make history as co-reflective creatures, that is, as 
rational beings who are potentially critical of both themselves and their environment. As long as 
social development remains subject to social critique, the evolutionary course of human history 
will depend on the emancipatory force of critical capacity. Social critique gives us the social 
power to determine social development according to social needs. 
The anthropological significance of critical capacity is reflected in the fact that it enables us 
to determine the course of history not by resorting to the forceful force of violence, but by 
mobilising the forceless force of discourse: the legitimacy of a discourse-guided normativity has 
the evolutionary power to shape the history of a purpose-laden society. In fact, the communicative 
engagement in discourse is such a constitutive component of maturing societies that the 
employment of violence is conceivable only as the refusal to draw on the coordinative power of 
our communicative competence. ‘To be a potential participant in discourse means to be human. 
The decision not to communicate, not to have any authority in discourse or to inflict violence 
upon others, all depends, then, on this prior competence’ (Matustik 1989, 164). Every time we 
decide to let violence decide, we decide to let discourse hide; and every time we decide to let 
discourse decide, we decide to put violence aside. As a linguistic species, we have learned to 
mobilise the empowering resources inherent in communicative discourses in order to make the 
course of history contingent upon the deliberative force of critical capacity. 
 
  
 
 
7. Critique and legitimation 
The stability of every political and economic system rests on its capacity to claim legitimacy in 
relation to a given society. Different resources of critique can either reinforce or undermine the 
legitimacy of the political arrangements created by society. All processes of political institutio- 
nalisation hinge on processes of ideological legitimation that ensure the functioning of their sys- 
temic coordination. In essence, the legitimation of a polity depends on its recognition by society. 
By legitimacy I understand the worthiness of a political order to be recognized. The claim to legiti- 
macy is related to the social-integrative preservation of a normatively determined social identity. 
Legitimations serve to make good this claim, that is, to show how and why existing (or rec- 
ommended) institutions are fit to employ political power in such a way that the values constitutive 
for the identity of the society will be realized. (Habermas 1984 [1976]-b, 182 – 3, italics in original) 
In other words, the legitimacy of every polity is contingent upon its capacity to claim validity 
through its recognition by a given society. The fact that legitimacy claims can never free 
themselves from their dependence on validity claims implies that the most powerful political 
system capable of control and action ultimately hinges on acceptance by its citizens capable of 
critique and action. Hence, legitimacy is not only about systemic hegemony based on    power 
and control, but also about discursive defensibility derived from reason and   critique. 
Legitimacy means that there are good arguments for a political order’s claim to be recognized as right 
and just; a legitimate order deserves recognition. Legitimacy means a political order’s worthiness to 
be recognized. This definition highlights the fact that legitimacy is a contestable validity claim; the 
stability of the order of domination (also) depends on its (at least) de facto recognition. (Habermas 
1984 [1976]-b, 178, italics in original) 
The stability of every polity rests upon its capacity to control its own contestability. The crisis of 
every polity is indicative of its incapacity to avoid being superseded by its own contestability. The 
resources of critique mobilised by subjects capable of speech and action can challenge the 
resources of control imposed upon them by systems capable of steering and action. The ‘legitima- 
tions that a society accepts or criticizes’ (Habermas 1987 [1965/1968], 313) need to reach a reason- 
able level of justification (Habermas 1984 [1976]-b, 183, italics in original) in order to ensure their 
own validation: political orders incapable of legitimation are essentially rational orders incapable of 
justification. A central function of critique consists in questioning the rational validity of political 
legitimacy either to reinforce or to undermine the relative stability of a given society. If the validity 
of political legitimacy is conditional upon the legitimacy of linguistic validity, then the systemic 
potential of political control is subject to the communicative potential of social critique. 
 
8. Critique and democracy 
Every genuine democracy depends on a healthy degree of legitimacy. If legitimacy is mainly 
about a political order’s worthiness to be recognised, democracy is essentially about a political 
order’s trustworthiness to be realised. Trustworthy citizens need trustworthy political systems to 
create trustworthy societies. Trustworthy citizens are citizens prepared to accept and, if necess- 
ary, reciprocate critique; trustworthy political systems are systems prepared to absorb and, if 
necessary, protect critique; and trustworthy societies are societies prepared to coordinate and,   if 
necessary, stimulate critique. Critique is one of the most fundamental resources of democracy 
because the former ensures the legitimacy of the latter. A democracy which cannot be criticised 
is a democracy which is undemocratic. The key insight underlying the Habermasian conception 
of deliberative democracy is that democratic processes of consensus-formation rest on commu- 
nicative processes of will-formation. Thus, the creation of deliberative democracy is based on the 
construction of a transparent polity whose coordinative power derives from its citizens’ 
communicative power: 
 
  
 
 
Communicative power is the power that emerges from the exercise of political autonomy, and hence 
cannot be separated from the discursive processes of will-formation, i.e., from democracy. (Preuss 
1998, 331) 
Communicative discourses are crucial to the functioning of democracy since they give meaning 
to the sociological value of our critical capacity. To ‘shift the burden of justifying the effective- 
ness of practical reason from the mentality of citizens to the deliberative forms of politics’ 
(Habermas 1998b, 386) means to locate the normative grounds of political legitimacy in the 
empowering potential of communicative rationality. Democracy without critique is tantamount 
to language without communication: one cannot exist without the other. Only political actions 
which can, in principle, be criticised can claim to be democratic; and only speech actions which 
can, in principle, be communicated can claim to be   linguistic. 
Deliberative democracy is a discursive community not of sleeping but of speaking members, 
for speech enables us to imbue political legitimacy with meaning-laden validity. Deliberative 
democracy is primarily a matter of actively engaging in communicative relations, rather than   of 
formally committing to contractual relations. ‘Consequently, a discursive or deliberative model 
replaces the contract model: the legal community constitutes itself not by way of a social contract 
but on the basis of a discursively achieved agreement’ (Habermas 1994, 137). Insofar as every 
discursively achieved agreement is open to revision, deliberative democracy converts 
communicatively mediated processes of collective will-formation into the cornerstone of its own 
existence. Criticisability is not only an integral component but also a normative principle of 
deliberative democracy: the criticisability of every linguistic validity claim28 anticipates the 
criticisability of every democratic legitimacy claim. 
 
9. Critique and religion 
From Habermas’s communication-theoretic perspective, the relation between critique and 
religion is not a straightforward one. Although reason and faith do not necessarily contradict one 
another, they are not always reconcilable. Religiously motivated validity claims might be sincere, 
but this does not make them true or right. Our linguistic orientation towards truth, rightness, 
sincerity, and comprehensibility must strive for rational justifiability, rather than     for wishful 
spirituality, in order to claim universal validity. If ‘churches in modern societies’ (Habermas 
1992, 229) can be described as ‘communities of interpretation’ (Habermas 1992, 229), rational 
discourses in modern societies can be regarded as linguistic provinces of critical reflection. 
Of course, both religious and secular discourses are embedded in the contextual contingency 
of their respective socio-historical determinacy. All subjects capable of speech and action – 
whether they consider themselves religious or secular – must be socialised into communities of 
interpretation in order to explore the various provinces of linguistic signification.  Yet, given that 
‘[r]eligious discourse is closely joined to a ritual praxis that, in comparison with profane everyday 
praxis, is limited in the degree of its freedom of communication [.. .], it could be said that faith 
is protected against a radical problematization by its being rooted in cult’ (Habermas 1992, 233). 
Whereas the whole point of secular discourses is to measure the contingency of their own 
legitimacy against the rationality of discursive validity, the mission of religious discourses is    to 
assert the universality of their own legitimacy through the rituality of ceremonial validity. Any 
discourse which is immune to self-problematisation is a discourse which is immune to self-
adaptation. Different epochs create different Zeitgeister (‘spirits of the time’), but if the Geist 
(‘spirit’) pretends to stand above the Zeit (‘time’) it fails to recognise that its quest for temporal 
transcendence remains trapped in temporal immanence: we have to be situated in time 
 
  
 
 
before we can transcend it. The metaphysical pretension of timeless transcendence loses all 
worldly credibility when confronted with the postmetaphysical recognition of the time-laden 
immanence of every worldly society. ‘For under the conditions of postmetaphysical thinking, it 
is not enough to take shelter behind a concept of the Absolute’ (Habermas 1992, 227). Under 
conditions of radical critique, critique becomes a radical condition. And under the radical 
condition of critique, the concept of the Absolute degenerates into connotative rhetoric 
demystified by the denotative magic of the concrete. 
The communicative critique of the world is essentially concerned with the discursive pro- 
blematisation of the world. Following Habermas’s (1992, 233) three-dimensional conception   of 
the structure of language, ‘[t]his problematization unavoidably occurs when the ontic, normative, 
and expressive aspects of validity, which must remain fused together in the conceptions of the 
creator and  redeemer  God, of  theodicy,  and  of  the  event  of  salvation, are separated 
analytically from one another’. In other words, whereas the postmetaphysical problematisation 
of the world is founded on the analytical differentiation between the constative,  normative,  and  
expressive  dimensions  of  language,  the  religious  interpretation  of  the world is based on their 
fusion. Consequently, critique needs to distrust religious belief         if it seeks to provide rational, 
rather than metaphysical, grounds for the validity of its own legitimacy. 
 
10. Critique and modernity 
The critique of modernity belongs to the condition of modernity, because the self-critical spirit 
of the Enlightenment is a modern precondition for the possibility of ethical self-government.29 
The existence of ethical self-government depends on the interdependence of our Verstand 
(reasoning reason) and our Vernunft (reasonable reason). As verstandgeleitete Wesen (i.e. as 
entities guided by reasoning reason), we can measure the outcome of our actions in terms of their 
purposive utility and social functionality. As vernunftgeleitete Wesen (i.e. as entities guided by 
reasonable reason), we can measure the outcome of our actions in terms of their normative 
validity and social legitimacy. The question is not whether or not Verstand and Vernunft can exist 
independently of one another; the question is how Verstand and Vernunft can be brought together. 
Hence, the challenge consists in creating the social conditions which allow for the possibility of 
both a versta¨ndliche Vernunft (comprehensible reason) and a vernu¨nftiger Verstand (sensible 
reason). 
The paradox of modernity is that it constitutes a historical era made possible by its own 
impossibility:  too  often  has  the  promise  of  the  versta¨ndliche  Vernunft  (comprehensible 
reason)  led  to  the  rise  of  the  unversta¨ndliche  Unvernunft  (incomprehensible  unreason),  and 
too  often  has  the  guarantee  of  the  vernu¨ nftiger  Verstand  (sensible  reason)  resulted  in  the 
tragedy of the unvernu¨nftiger Unverstand (senseless unreason). Given the historical realisation 
of both its emancipatory and its repressive potentials, modernity is a condition of profound 
ambiguity (cf. Bauman 1991). Despite its unfulfilled promises, however, the critical spirit of 
modernity has never promised to be fully fulfilled. Real strength believes in its own weakness, 
and modernity has believed in its own weakness from the very   beginning.30 
The critical potential of linguisticality is not undermined but reinforced by the project of 
modernity. Nevertheless, just as it is mistaken to paint an overly optimistic picture which stresses 
only the bright sides of the modern world, it is erroneous to give an excessively pessimistic 
account which centres exclusively on its dark sides. Indeed, a critical account of modernity should 
strive to come to terms with the intrinsic ambiguity of the type of society which started to emerge 
in Western Europe in the eighteenth century. In essence, the schizophrenic nature of the dialectics  
of Enlightenment (see Horkheimer and Adorno 1994 [1944/1969])    is 
 
  
 
 
grounded in the ambivalent nature of the modern project: the interplay between the emanci- 
patory and the repressive dimensions of modern society. We only need to consider the most 
influential sociological critiques of the last 150 years to understand the deeply problematic nature 
of modern society: the Marxian critique of social alienation (see Marx 2000/1977 [1844]), the 
Weberian critique of social rationalisation (see Weber 1978 [1922]), the Durkheimian critique of 
social differentiation (see Durkheim 1984 [1893]), the Simmelian critique of social  abstraction  
(see  Simmel  1997  [1903]),  and  the  Luka´cian  critique  of  social  reification (see  Luka´cs  1971).  
Yet,  this  is  not  where  the  problem  ends;  this  is  where  the  problem starts. It is crucial to 
uncover the various pathologies produced by modern society in order       to decipher the 
functional rationalities which underlie its numerous irrationalities. It is also essential, however, 
to recognise the various opportunities created by modern society in order to do justice to the 
empowering possibilities which pose a challenge to its disempowering obstacles. 
The Habermasian distinction between system and lifeworld31  allows  us  to differentiate 
between the disempowering and the empowering dimensions of modernity epitomised in the 
opposition between the two most fundamental forms of human rationality: instrumental ration- 
ality and communicative rationality.32 Whereas the functional reproduction of the utility-driven 
system depends on the power of instrumental rationality, the social reproduction of the linguis- 
tically structured lifeworld hinges on the power of communicative rationality. Given that the most 
differentiated form of society cannot exist without ordinary linguistic interactionality,    the 
instrumental rationality which arises from the systemic steering necessity of large-scale structural 
complexity can colonise, but never extinguish, the communicative rationality which ineluctably 
emerges in every lifeworld reality. Thus, the historical predominance of functionalist rationality 
in the context of modernity cannot eliminate the ontological preponderance of  com- 
municative rationality, which is built into the condition of humanity. Critique needs to start where 
communication ends. We would not be able to criticise the disempowering effects of instrumental 
rationality if we could not rely on the empowering potentials of communicative rationality. 
The paradoxical nature of modernity is that it simultaneously undermines and reinforces the 
emancipatory nature of communicative rationality: it jeopardises it insofar as it imposes the 
undeniable force of instrumental rationality on almost every sphere of society; at the same  time, 
it enhances it insofar as it generates collective learning processes  to  allow  for  the radical 
critique of systemic functionality. Under modern parameters, everything ‘can be exposed to 
testing’ (Habermas 1987 [1981]-h, 133) because, in principle, everything is open to the 
communicative experience of discursive questioning. 
Certainly, it is not only the colonisation but also the rationalisation of the lifeworld which 
poses a challenge to modern society. Yet, whereas the colonisation of the lifeworld by the system 
is indicative of the penetration of the communicative infrastructure by the instrumental 
superstructure of society, the rationalisation of the lifeworld is symptomatic of society’s capacity 
to draw on the differentiation of its communicative foundations to counterbalance     the 
detrimental effects of its systemic pathologisation. For ‘the further the structural components of 
the lifeworld and the processes that contribute to maintaining them get differentiated, the more 
interaction contexts come under conditions of rationally motivated mutual understanding, that is, 
of consensus formation that rests in the end on the authority of the    better argument’ (Habermas 
1987 [1981]-h, 145, italics in original). Ultimately, the authority of the better argument is the 
authority of the better critique.33 If modernity succeeds in converting the authority of the better 
argument into the discursive driving force of its own contingency, it will succeed in determining 
the future of society by mobilising the power of critical capacity. 
 
  
 
 
Conclusion 
As demonstrated above, the concept of critique is a central theoretical category in Habermas’s 
social and political thought. The foregoing analysis has examined the paradigmatic status of the 
concept of critique in Habermasian thought on 10 key thematic levels: (1) critique and the public 
sphere, (2) critique and knowledge, (3) critique and language, (4) critique and morality, (5) cri- 
tique and ethics, (6) critique and evolution, (7) critique and legitimation, (8) critique and democ- 
racy, (9) critique and religion, and (10) critique and   modernity. 
The insights of the preceding analysis, which has sought to shed light on Habermas’s multi- 
faceted concerns with the nature and function of critique, can be synthesised as    follows: 
(1) Public spheres cannot do without public critique. Critique is a discursive driving force 
of modern public spheres. 
(2) Knowledge claims are only conceivable as criticisable validity claims. Critique allows 
us to question both the discursive validity and the social legitimacy of   knowledge. 
(3) If human language is essentially a product of human communication, and if our critical 
capacity emanates from our communicative capacity, then we are able to develop a 
critical relation to the world only insofar as we develop a linguistic relation to the world. 
Critique is embedded in language. 
(4) The moral development of subjects capable of judgement and action is inextricably 
linked to the linguistic development of subjects capable of speech and action. Critique 
enables us to face up to the fact that the human world is never simply a world of facticity 
but always also a world of validity. 
(5) Ethical and judicial conventions produced by different societies are historically specific 
arrangements based on communicatively established normativities. Critique functions 
both as a creator and as a controller of ethical and judicial   conventions. 
(6) The historical evolution of society is shaped by the reflexive constitution of language. 
Put differently, sustainable sociability (aufrechterhaltbare Gesellschaftlichkeit) is 
inconceivable without criticisable linguisticality (kritisierbare Sprachlichkeit). Social 
critique has always shaped, and will always continue to shape, social   development. 
(7) The stability of political legitimacy hinges on its capacity to be considered worthy of 
rational acceptability. Critique enables us to expose the legitimacy of a given polity to 
the discursive scrutiny of communicative rationality. 
(8) The civilisational consolidation of political democracy is impossible without the 
communicational realisation of linguistic intelligibility. Critique is one of the most 
fundamental resources of democracy, because every genuine democracy depends on    a 
healthy degree of legitimacy based on discursive   acceptability. 
(9) The metaphysical power of religious faith can and should be challenged by the post- 
metaphysical power of communicative reason. Critique ensures that rational grounds of 
validity cannot seek refuge in metaphysical imaginaries of   rituality. 
(10) If the emancipatory potential of modern society is located in the critical potential of 
communicative rationality, then the condition of modernity contains the possibility    of 
converting the authority of communicatively established validity into the discursive 
driving force of its own contingency. The critique of modernity is built into the con- 
dition of modernity. 
On the basis of the previous analysis, it would be fair to suggest that one of the most fundamental 
presuppositions underlying Habermas’s communication-theoretic account of society is the 
assumption that subjects ‘capable of speech and action’ are also ‘capable of critique and  action’. 
As subjects capable of speech, we can comprehend the world; as subjects capable of 
 
  
 
 
action, we can change it; and, as subjects capable of critique, we can judge both our speech and 
our actions. 
The question remains, however, where the main shortcomings of Habermas’s multifaceted 
notion of critique lie. In other words, how can we critique Habermas’s conception of critique? 
Given Habermas’s categorical commitment to and thorough engagement with the discursive 
exercise of critique, it seems not only legitimate but also imperative to make the Habermasian 
subject of critique an object of critique. Thus, this essay shall be concluded by reflecting on some 
of the limitations of Habermas’s conception of critique. For the purpose of this paper, this shall 
be done by following the structure of the preceding   analysis. 
(1) Critique and the public sphere: Critique constitutes a discursive driving force of modern 
public spheres. Yet, the Habermasian assumption that the modern public sphere can be regarded 
primarily as an arena for social critique based on intersubjective reasoning is somewhat ideal- 
istic. While largely discursive – such as political, scientific, and journalistic –  realms  of modern 
public spheres may be described as breeding grounds for ‘rational-critical public debate’ 
(Habermas 1989 [1962], 178, italics added), predominantly non-discursive – such as 
administrative, executive, and indeed military  –  realms of modern public spheres may be   more 
appropriately considered as systemic manifestations of a rational-instrumental public domain. 
Critique is an integral component, but not always the ultimate driving force,  of modern public 
spheres. 
(2) Critique and knowledge: To the extent that all knowledge claims are – at least in principle 
– criticisable validity claims, all knowledge claims are – at least in practice – relatively arbitrary 
legitimacy claims. If validity and knowledge are intimately intertwined because the evolution of 
cognition is subject to the constitution of social critique, legitimacy and knowledge are closely 
interrelated because the evolution of cognition is subject to the distribution of social power. 
Different positions in society constitute different sources of authority with different resources of 
legitimacy. The rational power of cognitive validity is always dependent upon the authorising 
power of social legitimacy. Critique is a vital ingredient, but not necessarily the decisive force, 
of knowledge production. 
(3) Critique and language: Although Habermas is right to remind us of the fact that our criti- 
cal capacity is embedded in our communicative capacity, his language-focused conception of 
critique does not account for non-linguistic – yet equally powerful and species-constitutive – 
ways of distancing ourselves from our immersion in the world. The emancipatory transcendence 
which inhabits aesthetic experience and artistic creativity – thoroughly explored and passio- 
nately defended by Adorno (1997 [1970]) – represents an empowering feature of a desiderative 
and imaginative species. If, however, Gesellschaftskritik (social critique) is reduced to Sprach- 
kritik (linguistic critique), then Gesellschaftsutopie (social utopia) degenerates into a form of 
Sprachutopie (linguistic utopia). Artistic expression can be emancipatory because of, rather than 
despite, its capacity to transcend the realm of linguistic conceptuality and thereby establish a 
critical relation to the constraining preponderance of social reality. Regardless of whether or not 
one believes in the critical potential of language, Habermas’s social theory is substantially flawed 
due to its lack of preoccupation with our non-linguistic, yet equally significant and potentially 
emancipatory, capacities to challenge the ineluctable predominance of societal immanence 
through the underlying presence of critical  transcendence. 
(4) Critique and morality: Despite the fact that Habermas convincingly points out that our 
moral ability to claim ethical validity cannot be divorced from our critical capacity to judge 
different standards of normativity, he underestimates the extent to which established codes of 
morality are a product of power-laden forms of agency in a vertically structured society, rather 
than an outcome of linguistic discursivity generated by horizontally shaped encounters of dialo- 
gical intersubjectivity. Inasmuch as the gradual development of our critical capacity enables us to 
 
  
 
 
move from the persuasive authority of preconventional morality and the integrative conformity of 
conventional morality to the reflective autonomy of postconventional morality, our daily immer- 
sion in social reality obliges us to cope with the situational contingency of human agency. What 
we consider right or wrong, appropriate or inappropriate, and legitimate or illegitimate is context- 
dependent, for different interactional realms of society impose different standards of normativity 
upon the unfolding of human agency. Hence, it is not always ‘the penetrating ideas of a persistent 
critique’ (Habermas 1988 [1963]-c, 256) but often the persistent power of a penetrating context 
which determines the relative validity of the most opportune morality. 
(5) Critique and ethics: While Habermas’s communication-theoretic account of society 
allows us to understand that critique functions both as a creator and as a controller of ethical and 
judicial conventions, it offers little in the way of a normative framework capable of      doing 
justice to the perspectival differentiality arising from the structural complexity  of  modern 
society. The growing complexity of social life under conditions of modernity has led not to a 
decrease but to an increase in perspectival differentiality. If a society  of  ideal  members is a 
collective imaginary of disembodied role-takers who conceive of themselves as unified members 
of a common humanity, a society of actual members is a collective entity of situated role-players 
who live their lives as divided members of a stratified reality. Paradoxically, critique can 
contribute to both the universalisation and the provincialisation of perspective. 
(6) Critique and evolution: Even though Habermas’s theory of communicative action 
permits us to shed light on the fact that the historical evolution of society is shaped by the reflex- 
ive constitution of linguisticality, it does not equip us with the conceptual and methodological 
tools to explore the sociological significance of non-discursive factors that can  alter  the  course 
of history. As communicative beings capable of cooperative and consensual action, we are able 
to make the course of history dependent upon the deliberative force of critical capacity. Yet, as 
calculative beings capable of competitive and conflictual action, we are prone to make the 
development of society contingent upon the purposive force of strategic rationality. Too often in 
human history has the forceless force of discourse been overruled by the forceful    force of 
violence to ignore the fact that our constructive capacity to engage in critical dialogue with others 
can be easily undermined by our destructive capacity to inflict symbolic or physical violence 
upon others. Social evolution is shaped not only by the forceless force of communicative 
discourse but also by the forceful force of purposive   violence. 
(7) Critique and legitimation: Notwithstanding the fact that Habermas’s communication- 
theoretic approach provides a useful normative framework for understanding that the relative 
stability of political legitimacy enjoyed by modern forms of democracy rests on their capacity  to 
be considered worthy of rational acceptability, it underestimates the extent to which the 
institutional and ideological authority of a given polity is a matter of material and symbolic 
hegemony, rather than of discursive defensibility. If radical critique hinges on openness  towards 
potential crisis creation, successful governance depends on resourcefulness in effective crisis 
prevention. The legitimacy of a given polity derives not only from the discursive power of 
communicative rationality to convert political authority into an object of criticisability, but also 
from the systemic power of functionalist rationality to transform political authority into an 
unquestioned source of hegemonic  stability. 
(8) Critique and democracy: There is little doubt that critique is one of the most fundamental 
resources of democracy. It is essential, however, to recognise that the existence of institutionally 
consolidated and judicially protected forms of deliberation is in no way a guarantee of the exist- 
ence of collectively empowering and culturally ingrained processes of emancipation. To be sure, 
a truly procedural notion of deliberation is based on the idea that genuine democracies need not 
only to protect but also to promote the discursive force of critique. Yet, the defence of critique as 
 
  
 
 
an invaluable resource for the realisation of democracy will not suffice to do justice to the variety 
and complexity of the substantive features underlying the construction of an emancipatory 
society. To allow for the possibility of responsible and accountable action coordination, critique 
needs to be treated as an indispensable resource of individual and collective will-formation. To 
allow for the possibility of an emancipatory society, critique needs to explore both the empow- 
ering and the disempowering potentials of humanity. 
(9) Critique and religion: Habermas is right to insist that the metaphysical power of religious 
faith can and should be challenged by the postmetaphysical power of communicative reason. 
Nevertheless, we also need to account for the fact that reason and faith are not as far apart as 
they may appear at first sight. Just as we may have belief in the power of reason, we may have 
reasons to believe in the power of faith. Indeed, given the presuppositional nature of all 
knowledge, reason cannot escape belief; and, given the cognitive nature of all faith, belief cannot 
escape reason. It would be erroneous to suggest that either reason or faith can claim to have a 
monopoly on the anthropological resource of critical capacity. For just as rationally grounded 
claims to validity cannot be abstracted from the implicit belief structure of their background 
presuppositionality, religiously motivated claims to validity cannot be dissociated from the 
communicative rationality of their background sociality. If reason cannot exist without a belief 
in reason and if belief cannot exist without a reason to believe, then the critique of reason cannot 
do without a critique of faith just as the critique of faith cannot do without a critique of reason. 
(10) Critique and modernity: Habermas’s distinction between system and lifeworld provides 
a powerful tool to understand the interplay between instrumental and communicative rationality 
in the context of modern society. The problem with this central Habermasian distinction with 
regard to the nature of critique, however, is that it reduces – somewhat pessimistically – the 
system to a utility-driven realm of efficiency and a power-laden resource of instrumental ration- 
ality, while portraying – somewhat optimistically – the lifeworld as an integrative realm of social 
solidarity and an interpretive resource of communicative rationality. The point is not to deny the 
instrumental nature of the system and the communicative nature of the lifeworld; rather, the point 
is to explore to what extent, in the context of modernity, the system is exposed to the critical 
force of communicative rationality just as the lifeworld is always already permeated by the 
purposive force of instrumental rationality. If the system and the lifeworld are internally divided 
between instrumental and communicative rationality, then both spheres have the potential to 
make the detrimental effects of a functionally driven society subject to the enlightening power of 
critical capacity. 
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b, 317, 327, 356 – 73). In the secondary literature, see, for example, Bohman (1989, 393), Deflem 
(1994, 7 – 8), and Kelly (2004, 42). 
27. On the Habermasian notion of ‘authorship’, see, for example, Habermas (1988 [1963]-b, 218, 244, and 
246 – 52; 1987 [1968]-b, 155 – 7; 2001a, 26 – 8; 2004a, esp. 871 – 2, 874 – 81, 884 – 87, and 890). See also 
Cooke (1999, esp. 26 – 32 and 47 – 8) and Susen (2007, 31 – 6). 
28. Habermas repeatedly stresses the idea that validity claims are always and necessarily criticisable. See, 
for example, Habermas (1987 [1981]-f, 287, 305, 308, and 333; 1987 [1981]-h, 125 – 6, 137, 139, and 
149 – 50; 1982, 269; 2001a, 33, 79, and 82 – 3). 
29. On Habermas’s insistence on the self-critical spirit of the Enlightenment, see esp. Habermas (1987 
[1981]-j, 1996 [1981], 1987 [1985]-a, 1992 [1988]). See also Hudson (1993), Ingram (2005), and 
Passerin d’Entre`ves (1996). 
30. See Habermas (1987 [1985]-b, 302): ‘The New Critique of Reason suppresses that almost 200-year-old 
counterdiscourse inherent in modernity itself [.. .]. The latter discourse set out from Kantian philosophy 
as an unconscious expression of the modern age  and pursued the goal of enlightening    the 
Enlightenment about its own narrow-mindedness.’ (Italics added.) 
31. On Habermas’s distinction between system and lifeworld, see esp. Habermas (1987 [1981]-g, 1987 
[1981]-i). See also, for instance, Bohman (1989), Hartmann (1985), and Susen (2007, 61 – 73). 
32. See, for example, Habermas (1984 [1977], 1985 [1984]). See also, for example, Johnson (1991) and 
Raulet (1996). 
33. On Habermas’s notion of ‘the authority of the better argument’, see, for example, Habermas (2001 
[1984]-d, esp. 94 – 9; 2001a, 13, 44, 45, and 79). In the secondary literature, see, for example, Apel 
(1990 [1985], 35, 41 – 2, and 50), Fultner (2001, xv), Pellizzoni (2001), Power (2000), Ray (2004, 317 
– 8), Rochlitz (1996), Susen (2009a, 96 – 7), Susen (2009b, 111 – 2), and Whitton (1992, 307). 
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